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The purpose of a handbook is to get us going and guide us on a topic. In order to be writable, 
of course, its topic needs to have been going for some time. In the case of a philosophical topic, 
its debates need to be fairly well-developed, its different positions fairly well staked-out, its 
more-or-less standard routes run. For that reason, the present seems recently appropriate for a 
handbook on virtue, a topic which has now been a serious contender in contemporary ethical 
thinking for around forty years. Cambridge University Press gave us a “companion” to virtue 
ethics in 2013, Routledge gave us a companion and a handbook in 2014 and 2015, respectively 
– why both is unclear – and now we have The Oxford Handbook of Virtue edited by Nancy E. 
Snow. The amount of overlap with the others (in topics covered and even particular 
contributors) is not insignificant, but in its almost twice as many pages, it nonetheless offers us 
a lot. It works well both as a reasonably unified study and as a collection of papers which (with 
few exceptions) can be read – or assigned – independently of each other. 
A first important point to make about the Oxford handbook is that it’s a handbook of 
‘virtue’, rather than of ‘virtue ethics’ or even of ‘virtue theory’. Whereas the Cambridge version 
treats only virtue ethics and applied virtue ethics, and Routledge does the same while treating 
virtue epistemology in a separate handbook, the Oxford handbook gives significant attention 
to each. Given its virtue epistemological content, ‘virtue’ is clearly more appropriate than 
‘virtue ethics’. Calling itself a handbook of virtue rather than of ‘virtue theory’ also enables it 
to give significant time to both “virtue theory” and “theory of virtue” – a distinction that’s very 
helpful for fitting figures like Hume and Kant, as well as religious traditions like Buddhism 
and Islam, into the virtue tradition. Whereas a virtue theory makes the notion of virtue central 
to its ethics or epistemology, a theory of virtue merely gives space to and an account of the 
notion. Hume, Kant, and certain Buddhist and Islamic thinkers are thus helpfully and fairly 
uncontroversially included in this handbook on virtue.  
 After Snow’s introduction, Part I lays out three accounts of virtue: as a character trait, 
as a sensitivity, and as a skill. At first these might seem like competing accounts, but while the 
latter two are more controversial, one could in principle hold all three. Snow thus appropriately 
refers to them as ‘conceptualizations’ of virtue (p. 2). That virtue is a character trait is pretty 
well assumed by everyone in the book (at least until we get to reliabilist virtue epistemology); 
and the other two accounts are drawn on by various authors as well. One question that seemed 
to me underemphasized here – and indeed in the rest of the handbook – is whether virtue is a 
kind of knowledge. In discussing Iris Murdoch and John McDowell’s ideas that virtue is a kind 
of sensitivity, Bridget Clarke (Chapter 2) plausibly assumes (given that Murdoch and 
McDowell do) that virtue is a kind of knowledge; and in discussing virtue as a skill, Matt 
Stichter (Chapter 3) does often imply that virtue either involves or is a kind of practical 
knowledge; but given how perennial and controversial a question this is, I found myself 
wishing that there had been more direct engagement with it, either in this part or others.  
Part II turns to various historical and religious accounts of virtue. Here, there are 
chapters on virtue in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Buddhism, Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, 
Islam, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, and a variant of Christianity (additional to Aquinas’). 
Of these, Aristotle has dominated contemporary discussions of virtue (followed by Plato and 
Hume), and though these and other well-known virtue figures receive good treatment here, the 
less mainstream ones are likely to draw more interest in a handbook. I’ll just mention a few of 
the ideas that I enjoyed coming across here; the chapters of course cover much more. Lawrence 
C. Becker (Chapter 6) continues to emphasize the distinction between Stoicism and stoicism 
by discussing the importance of oikeōsis, the process by which the Stoics believed children 
come to love things external to themselves as much as they love themselves, an important step 
in Stoic social-ethical development. Justin Tiwald (Chapter 8) describes the importance of 
ritual practice across Confucian and Neo-Confucian conceptions of virtue while also 
explaining their break: Neo-Confucianism developed in response to the rising popularity of the 
more metaphysically intriguing Buddhism in the 11th century CE and was, at least in part, if 
Tiwald is correct, needed in order to compete. And Elizabeth M. Bucar (Chapter 10) discusses 
Islam’s first systematic treatment of virtue – Miskawayh’s The Refinement of Character (10th 
century CE) – and explains its central idea of internal unity with God and external harmony 
with the world as a development of ideas in Plato and Aristotle. Not all of the chapters in Part 
II would serve as excellent introductions to their topics, and some are not especially clear about 
the fact that they are treating merely an aspect of a tradition; but many are excellent 
introductions and are clear about their scope as well. As a whole, they present a treatment of 
the history of thinking about virtue that’s about as complete as could be asked for in a single 
edited volume. 
 Parts III – V turn to contemporary approaches to ethical virtue – beginning with an 
account of virtue theory’s resurgence in the 20th century (Chapter 15) – as well as some central 
issues in contemporary debates, and criticisms of the virtue ethical project. I skip to the 
criticisms. The central criticism discussed – indeed, discussed at some length in numerous 
chapters of the book – is situationism, the view that the notion of virtue has been undermined 
by psychological research into how situations, rather than character, influence human behavior. 
Situationism aims to show that “character” is a folk psychological concept lacking a basis in 
real psychology. Despite all the attention paid to it, however, no one here seems genuinely 
worried. The handbook’s authors offer numerous and varied responses to situationism. Some 
are appropriately handbook summaries of standard responses; but some seem to be original 
contributions that may deserve wider attention. Tom Bates and Pauline Kleingeld (Chapter 27), 
for instance, argue that situationism is empirically ill-supported on the basis that situationists 
have failed to consider the possibility that global vices like selfishness, cowardice, and laziness 
explain the way humans behave in the relevant experiments. Since vices are themselves (bad) 
character traits, they contend that the experiments rather support the notion of character and, 
at least in principle, of virtue. 
Part VI contains seven chapters on issues in applied virtue ethics – in medical ethics, 
business ethics, jurisprudence, education, environmental ethics, sexual ethics, and 
communication ethics. The most natural fit, of course, is education; and David Carr (Chapter 
32) makes a good case for thinking of Aristotelian ethics as suited to bringing together the three 
main approaches in recent ethics education debates (namely, cognitive developmental, care 
ethical, and character training approaches). Of the discussions here, Chapin Cimino’s (Chapter 
31) discussion of virtue jurisprudence requires the greatest amount of non-philosophical (and 
in particular, American jurisprudential) knowledge. I also found myself wishing that Jason 
Kawall’s (Chapter 33) discussion of environmental virtue ethics included the possibility of 
valuing the environment for its own sake, rather than for the sake of distinct human ends – this 
(to my mind better) alternative is mentioned by Cimino (p. 626) and in Christine Swanton’s 
(Chapter 12) list of virtues in Nietzsche (p. 247). The issue here is whether non-“moral” virtues 
aren’t also necessary for overall ethical virtue.  
The final part of the handbook, Part VII, takes up the topic of virtue epistemology, a 
topic which aims to model itself on virtue ethics but in regard to epistemic notions, such as 
knowledge or belief, which it understands, in one respect or another, by reference to 
specifically intellectual virtues, such as curiosity, receptivity, or (for some) mere vision. Most 
interesting here was a chapter not especially suited to a current handbook of virtue but perhaps 
to a future handbook of virtue: Michael Slote and Heather Battaly’s (Chapter 38) proposal of 
a “sentimentalist” virtue epistemology to compete with or else complement the more standard 
reliabilist and responsibilist approaches. The sentimentalist approach (as they admit, not 
entirely aptly named – so also called “personalism”) is only very recently being developed (by 
the same authors in some of the aforementioned companions, as well as in a forthcoming 
monograph by Slote), but it seems likely to garner more attention in the future.  
This is of course all too brief to do justice to such a large collection of papers. In my 
opinion, some of the papers here are very good, the vast majority are at least good, and only a 
few, not especially good. If I’m right, the chances of picking up The Oxford Handbook of Virtue 
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